Securing Tribal Sovereignty: A Theory for Overturning Lone Wolf by Aleinikoff, T. Alexander
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 38 
Issue 1 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: One Hundred 
Years Later 
Fall 2002 
Securing Tribal Sovereignty: A Theory for Overturning Lone Wolf 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
T. A. Aleinikoff, Securing Tribal Sovereignty: A Theory for Overturning Lone Wolf, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 57 
(2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol38/iss1/5 
This Native American Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
SECURING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: A THEORY
FOR OVERTURNING LONE WOLF*
T. Alexander Aleinikoff**
The aspect of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock' that I want to explore in this essay I
will label "congressional unilateralism." By this I mean both the power of
Congress to abridge or terminate tribal sovereignty, and also the power to do so in
the face of a prior treaty commitment not to change governing relations without
the consent of the tribe. Lone Wolf remains the Supreme Court's strongest
statement upholding congressional unilateralism. I propose a theory for curbing
Congress's plenary power, at least as it pertains to constitutive governing
arrangements. Specifically, I suggest that "mutual consent" provisions in Indian-
United States agreements ought to be viewed as binding, preventing unilateral
repeal of treaty commitments by federal statute. If this is right, then Lone Wolf is
wrong.
I. PLENARY POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
In an important article, Nell Jessup Newton has suggested a number of
constitutional limits that might be imposed on Congress's purported plenary
powers to regulate tribes. She reasons that the factors on which the Court has
relied to justify "strict scrutiny" in other areas of constitutional law ought to apply
with equal force in evaluating federal Indian policies. Among other proposals, she
argues that the Fifth Amendment imposes restrictions on congressional power to
extinguish aboriginal title and to take title to tribal land held in fee.2
The concept of the federal government's trust responsibility toward Indians
provides additional grounds for restricting plenary power.3 Although frequently
cited with more contempt than praise (owing to its source in United States v.
Kagama4 and other cases now seriously criticized), the trust doctrine arguably puts
* This essay is adapted from portions of a chapter of T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Semblances of
Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State and American Citizenship 126-40 (Harv. U. Press 2002). I
thank the Harvard University Press for permission to reprint the work.
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A., Swarthmore College; J.D., Yale.
1. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
2. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 195,249-61 (1984).
3. See Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 221-25 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.,
Michie Co. 1982) (citing cases).
4. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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a burden on Congress to show that its regulation of the tribes advances tribal
interests.5 And the Court has indicated, to mixed reviews,6 that the trust
responsibility can occasionally have constitutional bite.7
Subconstitutional norms may also aid in the domestication of plenary power.
Indian law posits an array of canons of statutory and treaty interpretation that
favors the tribes. For example, the Court reaffirmed in 1999 that "Indian treaties
are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the Indians" and that "any ambiguities
are to be resolved in their favor."8 So, too, the Court has required that Congress
make clear its intent to abrogate a prior treaty before a statute will be given such
effect.9 Philip Frickey has argued that, like the treaties themselves, these norms
have been breached in recent years.'0 But they remain available to jurists
interested in producing a kinder and gentler plenary power doctrine. Likewise,
the trust doctrine is regularly invoked in aid of statutory interpretation favorable
to the tribes and to provide a basis for judicial review of federal administrative
power." Christina Wood has made a powerful case for a reinvigorated trust
doctrine that would recognize the duty of the federal government to protect native
separatism and tribal sovereignty.'2
Together, these (and other) 3 strategies could be mobilized by the Supreme
Court to limit the plenary power doctrine. If successful, it would mean that
federal power over Indians would take its place among other federal powers that
are "plenary" in the sense that they apply to the entire subject matter but that are
not exempt from usual constitutional limits. As applied to congressional
regulation of Indian sovereignty, the results of such a move would not be trivial.
For example, congressional diminution of reservations or termination of tribes
might be challenged as violating constitutional protections of associational rights.
5. See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust
Doctrine Revisited, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 1471, 1508-13; U.S. v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 415-
16 (1980); Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565-66.
6. See Wood, supra n. 5, at 1509-11; Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native
Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995
Utah L. Rev. 109, 117.
7. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 415.
8. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 200 (1999).
9. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. U.S., 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968) (the Court, however, has said
that there is no duty on Congress to so state on the face of the statute); U.S. v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738
(1986).
10. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 418-26 (1993); but see Mille Lacs, 526 U.S.
at 218 (relying on canons in aid of tribe).
11. See Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra n. 3, at 220-28 (outlining the "trust
responsibility").
12. See generally Wood, supra n. 6.
13. For instance, strategies that incorporate the constitutional protections of association and culture
and family could limit the doctrine. See e.g. Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (First Amendment
protection of religion); Pierce v. Socy. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (substantive due process); Meyer
v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (substantive due process); see Newton, supra n. 2, at 264 ("[t]he Court's
willingness to protect... insular groups from forced homogenization demonstrates that values of
cultural diversity may be protected by the Constitution in a proper case"); but see Empl. Div., Dept. of
Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does
not bar a state from criminalizing a tribe's religious use of peyote).
[Vol. 38:57
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But subjecting congressional exercises of power to constitutional limits may
not, in the end, get to the nub of the sovereignty issue. A fully "decolonized"'
14
Indian law requires more than limits on federal power. It must secure
self-determination in the deeper sense of protecting a tribe's authority to structure
its form of government and to choose means to pursue tribally determined ends.
As James Anaya has suggested, self-determination for indigenous peoples occurs
on two levels: it involves the development and implementation of day-to-day
policies that are the normal stuff of government (what Anaya terms on-going self-
determination) and it also includes decisions on constitutive arrangements, such as
governmental structure and membership rules. 5
Exercises of congressional plenary power have historically operated on both
levels. While federal action on the day-to-day level may be a significant intrusion
on tribal self-determination, it is commonplace in our constitutional structure:
federal policies frequently displace state policies regulating private conduct.1
6
What is distinct about Indian law is the insecurity of tribal decisions on the
constitutive level. Here, Congress has taken actions that would seem truly
extraordinary if applied to the states. It has unilaterally reduced the size of
reservations (and, correspondingly, the reach of tribal sovereignty), extended civil
and criminal jurisdiction over reservations, mandated that constitutions
established under the Indian Reorganization Act 7 be agreed to by the secretary of
the interior, and required federal administrative approval of tribal contracts and
land dispositions. Most remarkably, Congress has simply terminated tribes
altogether and dispersed their landholdings.
The Court has given its imprimatur to these actions. The 1979 case of
Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation8
considered the constitutionality of Public Law 280,9 under which the state of
Washington asserted partial criminal and civil jurisdiction over the reservation.
The tribe argued that the unilateral imposition of state authority violated its right
to self-government and was beyond the power of Congress. 20 The Court quickly
disposed of the constitutional claim, finding that the tribe had no "fundamental
right" to self-rule that would mandate special judicial protection. 21 It was "well-
established," it noted, "that Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power over
14. Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized
Federal Indian Law, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 77 (1993).
15. See S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 81-82 (Oxford U. Press 1996).
16. The outcome would be different, however, vis- -vis states themselves. The federal government
must still identify a federal power that justifies the legislation, and we have learned that even the
commerce power has its limits. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995). Regulation of the tribes remains plenary in the sense that Congress is deemed to possess full
regulatory power without appeal to any particular delegated power.
17. See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, §16, 48 Stat. 984, 987 (1934).
18. 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
19. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588, 588-90 (1953).
20. Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 500.
21. Id. at 501.
20021
3
Aleinikoff: Securing Tribal Sovereignty: A Theory for Overturning Lone Wolf
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2002
TULSA LAW REVIEW
Indian affairs, may restrict the retained sovereign powers of the Indian tribes. 2
23Even Justice Marshall's opinion in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, frequently
cited as near the apex of pro-sovereignty decisions, makes reference to the legal
principle that "Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the
powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess.,
24
Lone Wolf added insult to injury, holding that not only does Congress have
the power to unilaterally abrogate treaty rights, it has the power to do so in
25
violation of a provision requiring tribal consent for such action. The facts in
Lone Wolf need but brief recitation. Article 12 of the 1868 Treaty of Medicine
Lodge 26 between the United States and the Kiowa and Comanche tribes
prohibited cessions of reservation land unless approved by three-fourths of adult
male tribe members.27 In 1892, the government secured an agreement that called
for the allotment of tribal land, in effect terminating the reservation. Subsequent
investigation established that the agreement had been procured by fraud and,
despite representations of the federal agent to the contrary, had not been ratified
by three-fourths of the tribe. 29 Nonetheless, Congress adopted legislation in 1900
that essentially imposed the agreement on the tribe.3 ° Citing doctrine established
in the foreign affairs area that subsequent statutes can abrogate prior treaties, the
Supreme Court upheld the 1900 legislation. 3' The Court recognized that "of
course, a moral obligation rested upon Congress to act in good faith in performing
the stipulations entered into on its behalf," but no legal norm restricted "the
legislative power... [to] pass laws in conflict with treaties made with the
Indians. 3 2 In any event, said the Court, the claims of fraud could not be inquired
into by the Court since such matters were "solely within the domain of the
legislative authority, and its action is conclusive upon the courts. 3 3 "If injury was
occasioned" by the 1900 legislation, "relief must be sought by an appeal to...
[Congress] for redress, and not to the courts., 34 In short, violation of the Treaty of
Medicine Lodge was nonjusticiable.
Lone Wolf thus represents plenary power at the meta-level. It permits
Congress to change the rules that the tribes and federal government had agreed
would govern changes to the tribal-federal relationship-a power denied to the
tribes.
22. Id.
23. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
24. Id. at 56.
25. 187 U.S. 553.
26. The Treaty of Medicine Lodge (Oct. 21, 1867), 15 Stat 581.
27. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564.
28. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. 553.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 566.
32. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 566 (citations omitted).
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Can a constitutional case be made that constitutive aspects of Indian self-
determination receive significant protection in the courts; or does Congress, as the
plenary power doctrine holds, truly have unfettered discretion to limit, rearrange,
and terminate tribal sovereignty?
One of the Lone Wolf roadblocks to judicial scrutiny is today out of the way.
The Court no longer holds that federal regulations governing the tribes present
"political questions" beyond the competence of the courts. In Delaware Tribal
Business Committee v. Weeks," the Court repudiated Lone Wolf on this point,
holding that the prior case "has not deterred this Court, particularly in this day,
from scrutinizing Indian legislation to determine whether it violates the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment.
3 6
Assuming, then, that burdens on Indian sovereignty are not wholly immune
from judicial scrutiny, the question remains whether such sovereignty receives any
substantive protection. Protection might be afforded (1) if tribal sovereignty is a
protectable interest secured by the Constitution, or (2) if federal legislation
creates a "vested right" whose abridgment would warrant judicial scrutiny of
congressional justifications.
II. SELF-GOVERNMENT AS A CONSTITUTIONALLY SECURED INTEREST
As to the first argument, that tribal sovereignty is secured by the
Constitution, Russel Barsh and James Henderson have suggested that Indian self-
government might be asserted as a fundamental right protected by the Ninth
Amendment,37 and Dean Newton has urged advocates to press the claim that
tribal sovereignty is secured under the Due Process Clause's protection of
liberty.38 Under both analyses, the constitutional text cited serves as a placeholder
for substantive rights whose source is outside the text.
There are a bundle of constitutional values in self-governance and protection
of culture that have been recognized in the Court's cases. The First Amendment's
Free Speech Clause protects the associational rights of groups to undertake
collective political and cultural action.39  The Amendment's guarantee of free
religious exercise protects dissenting groups that seek to preserve a traditional
form of association in the face of state demands for acculturation,4 ° and the Due
Process Clause has long been understood to protect family decisions on child
raising and schooling.41 To the extent that these cases establish a kind of group
35. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
36. Id. at 84. Furthermore, the Court has backed down from the broadest reading of Lone Wolf-
that Congress is free to take Indian land so long as it makes some gesture at compensation. See Sioux
Nation, 448 U.S. 371.
37. Russel L. Barsh & James Y. Henderson, The Road: Indian Tribes and Political Liberty 264-67
(U. Cal. Press 1980).
38. See Newton, supra n. 2, at 261.
39. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Hurley
v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
40. See Yoder, 406 U.S. 205.
41. See Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Meyer, 262 U.S. 390; Newton, supra n. 2, at 264.
2002]
5
Aleinikoff: Securing Tribal Sovereignty: A Theory for Overturning Lone Wolf
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2002
TULSA LAW REVIEW
privacy right to be free from governmental efforts aimed at "foster[ing] a
homogeneous people,"4 they complement the Court's reconceptualization of the
tribes as private, voluntary organizations.43
It has been argued that the constitutional values implicit in the cases can be
cobbled together to provide protection for tribal self-government." If so, then
federal legislation that infringes on sovereignty would presumably receive close
judicial scrutiny. 45 The associational rights argument, however, has yet to coalesce
for the courts. Constitutional norms might well protect tribes against state laws
that seek to regulate religious practices, 46 tribal membership,47 and decisions
regarding the education of children, but that is a long way from a constitutional
right to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over tribe members and nontribal
residents. As the constitutional claims on behalf of the tribes move from the
protection of culture to a power of "jurisgenesis,"48 the Court is likely to grow
increasingly concerned.49
There is another cluster of constitutional values that may be more fruitfully
invoked in a search for principles protecting tribal sovereignty.50 The Court has,
in recent years, provided strong protection for state processes from direct federal
regulation.51 The "commandeering" of state officials for federal duties is held to
be an unconstitutional intrusion into local decisionmaking, frustrating local
democracy and subverting accountability. 52  The idea that Congress could
restructure state governments is well beyond the pale.53 What is at stake in these
cases is not the substantive regulation of matters of local concern; as the Court
concedes, Congress retains authority to preempt state regulation of private
conduct on most matters. Rather, it is Congress's impact on the structure of local
government-that is, infringement on the constitutive level-that concerns the
Court. At the core of the federalism cases is a conceptualization of state
42. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402.
43. Cf. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
44. See Newton, supra n. 2, at 236-88.
45. Id. at 266.
46. But see Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
47. Compare Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (invalidating on First Amendment grounds state law requiring Boy
Scouts to admit gays as members).
48. See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 671, 751 (1989) (adopting term from Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983)).
49. Cf. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating affirmative action program
adopted by majority-black city council); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (subjecting to "strict
scrutiny" the use of race in drawing election districts).
50. See Richard W. Garnett, Once More into the Maze: United States v. Lopez, Tribal Self-
Determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 72 N.D. L. Rev. 433 (1996);
Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship between the United States
and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. Toledo L. Rev. 617 (1994).
51. See Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Lopez, 514 U.S. 549; N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
52. See Printz, 521 U.S. 898; N.Y., 505 U.S. 144.
53. This has been true from early days: Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (federal relocation of
state capital prohibited). This limit, however, is not so entrenched in the context of voting. See e.g.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
[Vol. 38:57
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sovereignty-not as a nonenumerated right of a group of people, but rather as an
underlying structural assumption of the constitutional order.
54
Tribal governing structures are not currently conceived of as part of that
order. But it is not hard to see how the justifications for protection of state
governments would translate to tribal sovereignty. Tribal sovereignty, like state
sovereignty, is neither created by federal delegation nor established by the
Constitution. It precedes, and receives recognition in, the Constitution.55 The
pre-established sovereignty of the tribes is reflected in the Commerce Clause,
which lists three kinds of political communities that do not owe their existence to
ratification of the Constitution: states, foreign nations, and Indian tribes.56 Tribes
may not be foreign nations, for which Congress has no power to regulate internal
affairs, but why might they not at least receive the same kind of protection as
states-that is, that their structure of government is for their citizens, and not for
Congress, to decide?
The values usually associated with federalism-accountability,
experimentation, and local diversity-apply in spades to tribal governments.
Whatever displacement of local choice occurs through preemptive national
legislation, it is far less intrusive than the wholesale restructuring of territory and
governance that Congress can impose on the reservations; and whatever merit
remains of Herbert Wechsler's description of the political safeguards of
federalism,57 it is hard to argue that the tribes are structurally represented in
Congress or in the Electoral College.58 Furthermore, tribal cultural and political
choices contribute at least as much to American diversity as do the activities of
states, which appear more and more to be mere local representations of national
political and cultural trends.
By analogy to the federalism cases, then, the Court could well hold that
constitutive tribal arrangements receive constitutional protection. 59 The received
wisdom that Congress has plenary authority to rearrange or extinguish Indian
sovereignty would be overturned just as was the post-New Deal assumption that
state sovereignty imposed no limits on plenary federal powers. To be sure, this
would work a dramatic change in the law. Perhaps Congress would retain power
to recognize tribes; but once recognized, tribes would be free to structure their
governments as they deem appropriate without federal supervision (short of a
54. See e.g. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
55. Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples, 45 Stan. L
Rev. 1311, 1333-35 (1993). "The legitimacy of Indian government is not based on the mere fact that
indigenous people were prior occupants of the continent, but on the fact that they were prior
sovereigns." Id. at 1333.
56. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
57. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 542 (1954).
58. Which is not to say that they do not have power as interest groups lobbying the federal
bureaucracy.
59. See Clinton, supra n. 14, at 124-25.
2002]
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showing of a compelling federal interest). Accordingly, current statutory
provisions requiring approval by the Secretary of the Interior of amendments to
tribe constitutions might well be unconstitutional, 6° and because tribal sovereignty
is so closely linked with territory, congressional diminution or termination of
reservations would not be permissible without tribal consent. So too limitations
on tribal criminal jurisdiction would be problematic. Were this the law, legislation
of the kind at issue in Lone Wolf would be invalid. These conclusions seem
radical when applied to Indian law, but imagine how the Court would respond to
federal regulation of state constitutions or to federal legislation purporting to
decrease the territory of a state.
III. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AS A STATUTE-BASED OR TREATY-BASED INTEREST
In the preceding section, I canvassed arguments that tribal sovereignty is a
protectable constitutional interest. An alternative approach would attempt to
locate a protectable interest of Indian sovereignty in the federal statutes that
affirm the tribes and their governing laws. The analogy here is to the important
line of cases holding that federal (and state) laws may create entitlements that
61
cannot be taken away without due process of law.
It is unlikely that statutory recognition of tribal authority alone is enough to
establish a "right" to self-governance. Not only does the plenary power doctrine
undercut a claim to entitlement to current governance structures, but also, more
important, the procedural due process cases establish rights to fair process, not
substantive rights to a continuation of the entitlement program. 6' Although
Congress cannot mandate that a flip of a coin determines one's eligibility for
welfare, it may-as recent history demonstrates-set a time limit on eligibility no
matter the harm imposed on the person who loses benefits.
Suppose, however, that Congress sought to guarantee the continuation of
tribal sovereignty by stating in legislation that governing arrangements could not
subsequently be altered without tribal consent. Would such a guarantee be
deemed to create a substantive entitlement to the sovereignty provided in the
statute? This is a different version of the question in Lone Wolf, which considered
whether Congress could take unilateral action in violation of a mutual consent
clause in a treaty. But the underlying issue is the same: whether a congressional
commitment not to alter governing arrangements of tribes without their consent
can bind a subsequent Congress.
The usual constitutional answer is that a sitting Congress may not bind a
future Congress. Borrowing language from constitutional debates, it would be
said that the first Congress may not entrench tribal sovereignty so as to limit a
subsequent Congress's power to arrange matters differently (or terminate
60. See 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2000).
61. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532
(1985). See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L. J. 733 (1964).
62. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
[Vol. 38:57
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 38 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol38/iss1/5
SECURING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
sovereignty altogether). Julian Eule63 has grounded the anti-entrenchment
principle in the concept of a temporal legislature, elected for a term of years with
limited power to control the future (or the past). 64 A Congress that can bind
future legislatures, in effect, denies the democratic rights of electors of the
subsequent Congress. Permitting entrenchment as an ordinary practice would
also likely have disastrous consequences for the congressional process. Members
of Congress facing electoral loss would seek to lock in long-term benefits for
constituencies, and subsequent Congresses would be under heavy pressure to do
the same for their favored groups. The utilitarian arguments against such
practices-particularly in a quickly changing world-provide a strong supplement
to the democratic theory concerns."
This is a foundational-if generally unexamined-assumption of
constitutional law, applied by the Court at the state66 and federal level. 6' There
are, to be sure, recognized exceptions to the principle. Congress may not declare
that land granted to a person by a prior Congress shall revert to the federal
government, nor may it repeal a contract made by an earlier Congress.68 The prior
acts are deemed to have established vested rights, and infringements of those
rights will call forth judicial remedies. Although seen as exceptions to the anti-
entrenchment rule, the vested rights cases in fact help define the rule. Many
things done by one Congress will affect subsequent Congresses. An aircraft
carrier purchased at time T cannot be handed back at time T plus 1; wages paid
today to government employees are not recallable tomorrow. This is simply the
application of a higher-level (constitutional) norm that protects property rights.
Indian law has affirmed this vested right principle to some extent, thereby
undercutting a reading of Lone Wolf that would permit Congress to take
recognized tribal land at will. In the landmark 1980 United States v. Sioux Nation
69
of Indians case, the Court held that Congress's taking of the Black Hills in
violation of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty7° could be challenged and that
compensation was due the tribe because the federal government could not
demonstrate that the abrogation of the treaty was an appropriate measure for
protecting and advancing tribal interests (a violation of the federal government's
trust responsibility).7" But the Court has shown no general inclination to rethink
63. See Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 379.
64. Limitations on altering past agreements are reflected in constitutional norms disfavoring
retroactive application of laws. See id. at 441-47.
65. See id. at 447-59.
66. See Stone v. Miss., 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
67. See Memo. from Teresa Wynn Roseborough, Dep. Asst. Atty. Gen., to Special Representative
for Guam Commonwealth, Mutual Consent Provisions in the Guam Commonwealth Legislation (July
28,1994) (copy on file with U.S. Dept. of Justice).
68. This can perhaps be traced to Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). See Eule,
supra n. 63, at 419-24.
69. 448 U.S. 371.
70. The Treaty of Fort Laramie (Apr. 29, 1868), 15 Stat. 635.
71. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 424. Technically, the Court held that if it could be shown that the
measure appropriately advanced tribal interests-by exchanging the taken land for property of
2002]
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the broader doctrine that a subsequent statute can abrogate a treaty. In Indian
law, the most that tribes can benefit from is a canon of interpretation that
Congress's intent to abrogate must be express. The trust doctrine/vested right
limit on the anti-entrenchment rule, then, is not available under current doctrine
to protect constitutive agreements between Congress and the tribes.73 There is no
reason to believe that a federal statute with a mutual consent clause would be
treated differently.
To say that treaties and statutory consent clauses do not protect governing
arrangements from subsequent change is not to say that tribal sovereignty might
not be entrenched under another theory. The argument I want to press is that
Congress and the tribes should be able to put constitutive arrangements beyond
the reach of unilateral congressional action by establishing the relationship in a
manner that resembles not ordinary politics, but higher lawmaking. The result of
such processes may be said either to constitute a limited exception to anti-
entrenchment principles or to constitute "mid-level lawmaking"-higher than
normal lawmaking but below constitutional politics.
74
This no doubt sounds foreign, but there are examples readily at hand. In the
twentieth century, a number of territories of the United States established new
relationships with Congress that may not be unilaterally altered: the Philippines
was granted independence, and Hawaii and Alaska were admitted as states.
These actions were not taken through the simple enactment of a statute. Each
case involved a multi-year process, with actions by the people of the territories as
a whole (not just their legislatures). Hawaiian statehood was the product of
lengthy deliberation and bipartisan support. More than twenty congressional
hearings over a twenty-five-year period considered the issue, and statehood
legislation, originally introduced in 1919, passed the House in 1947, 1950, and
1955."5 Both the Eisenhower and Truman administrations supported statehood
76for Hawaii. The process for admission required congressional approval of a
constitution drafted by the territory. Hawaii had convened a constitutional
convention in 1950, whose members were popularly elected.77 The convention's
draft constitution was submitted by plebiscite to the people of the territory, who
equivalent value-then the federal statute would not trigger the Just Compensation Clause. See id. at
371.
72. Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra n. 3, at 222-23; Menominee Tribe, 391
U.S. 404.
73. A contrary view is expressed in a 1963 memorandum of the Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Counsel regarding a "mutual consent" provision in a proposed United States-Puerto Rico
compact. The memorandum concludes that federal legislation could constitutionally create "vested
rights of a political nature" that could not be taken back without mutual agreement of the United
States and Puerto Rico. See Memo. from Off. Leg. Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Power of the United
States to Conclude with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico a Compact Which Could Be Modified Only
by Mutual Consent (July 23,1963) (copy on file with U.S. Dept. of Justice).
74. 1 am adopting Bruce Ackerman's terms of "normal lawmaking" and "higher
lawmaking/constitutional politics." See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 6-7 (Belknap
Press of Harv. U. Press 1998).
75. Sen. Rpt. 86-80, at 5-6 (March 5,1959).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2-3.
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approved the constitution by more than a three-to-one margin.78 Congress
proposed several minor amendments to the constitution,79 and the document was
again submitted to the people of Hawaii for approval.80 Following a favorable
vote in the territory, Hawaii was admitted to the Union.
Philippine independence was secured in a similar fashion. From the
beginning of United States authority over the Philippines in 1898, it was
understood that independence was the ultimate goal. Following federal legislation
in 1934,81 the Philippine legislature provided for the election of delegates to a
constitutional convention, which drafted a Constitution for the Commonwealth of
the Philippine Islands. The Constitution was approved by President Roosevelt
82
and by popular plebiscite. A commonwealth was to be established for ten years
83to provide a transition to independence. Although Japanese occupation during
World War II interrupted the process, the Philippines gained independence on
July 4, 1946. The admission of Hawaii and Alaska as states, and the independence
of the Philippines were products of federal legislation, but no one supposes that
the political changes wrought by the legislation could be undone by a subsequent
Congress.
Arrangements with the tribes seem somehow less permanent than either
admitting states or granting independence to territories. Just as the omission of
immigrants is commonly seen as a way-station to the full membership of
citizenship, and territorial governments have been viewed as preparing a territory
for eventual statehood, so too the "dependent sovereignty" of the tribes might be
seen as a status leading ultimately toward something more permanent. 84 In the
early days of Indian policy, the "solution" was removal of the tribes to areas
beyond white settlement (or extermination); in later days, it was the breakup of
the reservations and assimilation. There is, however, no obvious reason why a
formal agreement recognizing self-determination should be viewed as an
inappropriate long-term arrangement between the tribes and the federal
government-except that we are accustomed to thinking in other categories.
If such arrangements are the product of deliberative and consensual
processes, the values protected by the anti-entrenchment doctrine are not at risk.
Consider how an agreement between the tribes and the government might be
reached: the parties negotiate a compact that recognizes the sovereignty of the
tribe within designated boundaries; any limits on tribal authority are made
explicit; the tribe and Congress expressly approve the agreement; and the
agreement provides that it cannot be altered without the consent of both parties.
78. Id.
79. Act of March 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, §7, 73 Stat. 4 (1959).
80. The process is described in detail in Sen. Rpt. 86-80.
81. Act of March 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-127, 48 Stat. 456 (1934).
82. H.R. Doc. 74-144. (Mar. 25, 1935).
83. 48 Stat. at 463.
84. See Justice McLean's statement in his Worcester v. Georgia concurrence: "The exercise of the
power of self-government by the Indians, within a state, is undoubtedly contemplated to be
temporary." 31 U.S. 515, 593 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring).
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Under such circumstances, unilateral abrogation of the agreement would
undermine the democratic self-rule the agreement is designed to establish.
Moreover, the ratification of the agreement by the people of the tribe moves the
agreement out of the category of ordinary legislation." The act of the people
signifies a higher form of lawmaking, similar to the ratification of a constitution.
The framers of the United States Constitution understood the importance of
popular ratification. The Constitution drafted in 1787 went far beyond the terms
under which the Philadelphia Convention had assembled. Moreover, it included
provisions that would encroach on existing state prerogatives. Madison
recognized that a "higher Sanction than the Legislative authority" would be
necessary if the Constitution and ensuing federal laws were to be viewed as
legitimate and superior to state laws.86 Popular ratification could supply that
"sanction." According to historian Jack Rakove, Madison believed that
"[p]opular ratification provided more than a symbolic affirmation of popular
sovereignty; it promised to render the constitution legally superior to ordinary acts
of government that also expressed popular consent through mechanisms of
representation. 87 Ultimately, the Constitution drafted in Philadelphia included a
self-referential provision stating that it would come into force when approved by
"Conventions of nine states"-a formulation that expressly rejected other
proposals that state legislative approval could suffice.88
Rakove concludes that:
the resort to popular sovereignty.., marked the point where the distinction
between a constitution and ordinary law became the fundamental doctrine of...
political thinking....
Whatever else might be said about the legality or illegality of [the] process, it
produced a completely unambiguous result that ensured that the Constitution would
89
attain immediate legitimacy.
Tribal ratification is not a precise analogue because it involves popular
participation by only one of the parties. It may therefore be argued that whatever
meaning it has for the tribe, it cannot provide an exception to the
nonentrenchment doctrine that would bind the people of the United States. The
argument would carry weight if we were to reduce entrenchment to a specific
formula-for example, that it can occur only if approved in a particular manner by
the electorate and elected representatives. But it is unclear where such particular
rules would come from. The claim here is less rigid: it is that certain constitutive
arrangements, when adopted in a manner that goes beyond simple lawmaking on
85. Anupam Chander, Student Author, Sovereignty, Referenda, and the Entrenchment of a United
Kingdom Bill of Rights, 101 Yale L. J. 457 (1991).
86. Quoted in Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution 100 (Knopf 1996).
87. Id. at 101. See Ackerman, supra n. 74, at 169-75; The Federalist No. 40 (James Madison).
88. See Rakove, supra n. 86, at 105.
89. Id. at 130. See McCulloch v. St., 17 U.S. 316, 377-78 (1819).
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behalf of a people who expressly approve the structure, can establish binding
commitments.
Furthermore, the agreement is likely to be the product of a careful and
lengthy negotiation, perhaps involving the actions of several Congresses. Because
the negotiations are over constitutive arrangements, the risk that "ins" would
attempt to lock in particular policies (self-serving or not) seems minimal. This is
not to deny that long-term structural policies could be viewed in partisan terms
(consider statutes attempting to entrench rules on campaign contributions or
voting requirements), but it is hard to see partisan considerations playing an
important role in the negotiation of federal government-tribe agreements that
define a form of government for the tribe.
There is an additional consideration that removes constitutive arrangements
from the usual kind of legislation subject to the anti-entrenchment rule. Sovereign
arrangements demand a certain security if the governments they establish are to
flourish. (This idea receives recognition in Article V of the Constitution, which
establishes a difficult-to-mobilize amendment process.) Long-term planning-for
economic growth, resource management, and education-and public participation
may suffer if governing structures are subject to alteration by another authority.
In repudiating the tribal termination policy of the 1950s, the Nixon administration
recognized that "the mere threat of termination tends to discourage greater self-
sufficiency among Indian groups."9 ° This point may be generalized. Meaningful
self-determination needs a fence around constitutive arrangements, providing a
spatial and temporal independence that can inculcate commitment and long-term
vision within a demos.
It is therefore not surprising that the compacts with the Federated States of
Micronesia and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands include
provisions stating that the agreements cannot be modified without the consent of
both parties.9 That these provisions be understood as binding is of significant
importance to the populations of the polities recognized by the agreements. In
earlier days, the executive branch took the position that the mutual consent
provisions were binding on the federal government; and two opinions issued by
the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") took a similar
position. (One of the opinions was issued by then-Assistant Attorney General
William Rehnquist.)92
More recently, the OLC has opined that mutual consent provisions are not
outside the general rule of nonentrenchment. The issue has arisen in the
negotiations with Guam over a new commonwealth status. A draft Guam
Commonwealth Act 93 included two such provisions: one declaring that the Act
90. Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 1970 Pub. Papers 564, 567.
91. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with
the United States of America, Pub. L. No. 94-241, § 105, 90 Stat. 263, 264 (1976); Compact of Free
Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770 (1986) (published as a note to 48 U.S.C. §
1681 (1987)).
92. See Memo., supra n. 67, at 2 n. 2.
93. H.R. 1521, 103d Cong. (1993).
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would not be amendable without the consent of both governments, the other
stating that no federal laws or regulations adopted after enactment of the Act
would be applied to Guam without the mutual consent of Guam and Congress.94
A 1994 OLC opinion concluded that the provisions were unenforceable and that
their inclusion in the Act could create "illusory expectations that might...
mislead the electorate of Guam about the consequences of the legislation., 95 With
wooden logic and language, the opinion adopts a categorical approach: "The
plenary authority of Congress over a non-state area persists as long as the area
remains in that condition and terminates only when the area becomes a State or
ceases to be under United States sovereignty. There is no intermediary status as
far as the Congressional power is concerned., 96 The ground for this conclusion is
nearly an ipse dixit: it is declared that the power of Congress to delegate
governmental powers to "non-state areas" is "contingent on the retention by
Congress of its power to revise, alter, and revoke that legislation." 97  This
conclusion is said to be "but a specific application of the maxim that one Congress
cannot bind a subsequent Congress."98
The opinion does not reason to this result. It does not consider alternative
formulations or the possibility that constitutive arrangements might call forth a
different rule. The Justice Department recognizes that Congress's power to
amend earlier legislation is limited by the Constitution's Contracts and Due
Process Clauses but holds that these guarantees do not apply because "a specific
political relationship" cannot be considered a form of protected property.99 That
may well be correct, but it hardly ends the discussion. The question is whether
there are good grounds for holding that governing arrangements-popularly
ratified-are not subject to the nonentrenchment doctrine. That question is not
answered by a conclusion that such arrangements are not "property."
Whatever merit the OLC opinion may have as to territories, it would have
even less force if applied to tribal governments. As noted, the inherent authority
of the tribes is not a product of congressional delegation; recognition of tribal
sovereignty was thus not-in the words of the OLC opinion-accompanied by a
reserved power of Congress to revoke or amend. Such reserved authority might
be justified if territorial government is viewed as inherently nonpermanent, but
that reasoning cannot apply to tribal sovereignty in the era of self-determination.
James Anaya has summarized the evolving international law norms on
constitutive arrangements for indigenous peoples:
The world community now holds in contempt the imposition of government
structures upon people, regardless of their social or political makeup....
Today, procedures toward the creation, alteration or territorial extension of
94. Id. at §§ 103,202.
95. Memo., supra n. 67.
96. Id. at 6.
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id. at 7-10.
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governmental authority normally are regulated by self-determination
precepts requiring minimum levels of participation on the part of all
affected peoples commensurate with their respective interests. 1°°
IV. CONCLUSION
It is time to take stock. I have examined a range of arguments for
constitutional limits on Congress's plenary power over Indian tribes, including
claims that the right of self-government is constitutionally protected. I have
attempted to provide an additional argument as to how and why constitutive
arrangements that are the product of deliberative processes and tribal popular
approval might be protected against subsequent congressional alteration. If the
argument is persuasive, it would supply a limit on congressional plenary power,
even if other constitutionally based claims prove unsuccessful. And it would
undercut the congressional unilateralism approved in Lone Wolf a century ago.
100. Anaya, supra n. 15, at 82. See Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize
Federal Indian Control Law, 31 U. Mich J. L. Ref. 899, 946-48 (1998).
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